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Certain animals and, in particular, humans have always been curious about the mysteries
of the world. We have always shown interest in exploring the unknown, so that it becomes
known. The necessity of discovery is likely inherent to our nature and it is possibly related
to our limited time. Throughout the years, we have developed ways of communicating with
each other and other animals. In particular, we have developed ways of saving and transferring
information and knowledge. We have also developed ways of automating certain tasks, notably
artificial intelligence, which is one of the most promising fields, given that it has the potential
to enhance the quality of our lives. However, AI has also a few limitations and can also be
dangerous. So, there is the need, more than ever, to attempt to solve these limitations and
avoid the dangers.
Explainable (or interpretable) artificial intelligence (XAI) can refer to techniques that are
used to explain (to humans) or interpret the inner workings and outcomes (e.g. predictions)
of black box artificial intelligence (AI) or machine learning (ML) models. XAI can also refer
to white box AI or ML models whose inner workings and outcomes (or outputs) can be more
easily (with respect to black box ones) understood and trusted by humans 1 2.
XAI is related, in several ways, to strong AI (or artificial general intelligence), causation,
statistics (e.g. visualisation techniques), credit assignment problem, human-computer inter-
action, cognitive science, neuroscience, psychology, linguistics, consciousness, meta-learning,
legislation and ethics (e.g. free will).
1The definition of XAI is not yet standardised. For example, [1] distinguishes between interpretable and
explainable (or explanatory) AI. In this article, I am using explanatory (or explainable) and interpretable AI
interchangeably.
2Funnily enough, the expressions black box and white box are, in a certain way, discriminatory. However,
humans tend to categorise and give meanings to categories, which can be criticised (for several reasons) by other
individuals who have not created those categorisations or simply do not agree with them.
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Several XAI techniques have been proposed in recent years. For example, layer-wise rele-
vance propagation, which allows to visualize (as heat maps) the contributions of single pixels of
an image (which, in this case, is the input to the model) to predictions for multi-layered neu-
ral networks (and kernel-based classifiers over bag of words features) [2, 3], and LIME, which
explains the predictions of any classifier in an interpretable and faithful manner by learning an
interpretable model locally around the prediction [4]. These XAI techniques can be considered
(partially) model-agnostic, given that they can be applied to more than one model. There are
other possible categories and categorisations of XAI algorithms and models. For example, there
are model-specific or example-based XAI techniques [5].
The typical examples of black box AI or ML models are artificial neural networks (ANNs),
which, in the last decade, have achieved state of the art performance in several tasks, such
as machine translation [6], but that are still not well understood or, at least, not as much as
sometimes is required. An example of a white box model is the decision tree, whose inner
workings and predictions have a relatively clear interpretation or explanation (to humans).
ANNs have been shown to be strongly biased towards certain outcomes [7, 8] or easily
fooled [9]. Several works studied the limitations and robustness of ANNs [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15].
These works have shown that ANNs are sensitive to small perturbations of the inputs (which are
e.g. images or text), that is, the output of these ANNs is highly affected by small perturbations
or changes of the inputs3. Furthermore, several works have also shown that ANNs can be easily
attacked or hacked [16,17].
There are a few questions regarding these limitations and issues of ANNs that need to be
answered. Are these problems due to wrong inductive biases of the models [18] or due to the use
of non-representative data of the population (or both)? Can an ANN perform some operation
that is not understandable or conceivable to humans, so certain ANNs will always be black
boxes? If yes, how should we deal with these issues? What is the relation between current
ML approaches and causation (or causal inference)? Is causal inference strictly required to
be implemented or integrated into these systems so that to avoid these issues? Is there an a
trade-off between performance and interpretation of the inner workings of a model?
Nevertheless, in theory, ANNs (with at least a single hidden layer containing a finite number
of neurons) can approximate a wide variety of interesting functions4, so they are often denoted
by universal function approximators [20,21,22,23,24]. Their practical performance is thus also
a consequence of their theoretical powerfulness, but it is also due to the advances, in the last
decades, in computer hardware. There are also other universal function approximators, for
example, support vector machines [25], but, in recent years, they have not received as much
attention as ANNs, even though they are still a relatively valid ML method.
3Perturbed inputs are called often called adversarial inputs.
4More specifically, these interesting functions are continuous on compact subsets of Rn [19].
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In areas that involve human (but not only) lives, ethics or decisions that can severely
impact the life of people (and other living beings), like in healthcare, autonomous vehicles,
military missions, banking, insurance, legislation, jurisdiction, climate change, safety or security,
the adoption of ANNs can lead to undesirable and unfixable consequences, because of their
limitations and weaknesses mentioned above, so some people are legitimately hesitant to adopt
these black box ML techniques, even after considering their potential benefits and their recent
successes.
For example, in the context of healthcare, an explainable AI model that is in charge of
prescribing a dose of a certain drug could provide an detailed explanation of such decision
to the doctors, so that the doctors could first discuss it and eventually approve it or not.
If such an explanation is not available, the doctors can still hypothesize the reasons behind
such prescription, but, under the hood, the prescription by the AI might be due to completely
different reasons, which the doctors might not have envisaged. Consequently, the doctors could
be misleadingly persuaded by the unexplainable decision of the AI to take a certain possibly
fatal action. In the case the doctors do not have the time to discuss the AI prescription, they
can either accept or not the prescription. Who will be responsible for the possible undesirable
or fatal outcome?
Can an AI be responsible for such fatal or undesirable outcome? Can an AI have free will
and rights (in a similar way humans do [26])? There are futurists who claim that artificial
general intelligence and even super-intelligence is possible and that we should be concerned
with the possible associated dangers [27]. However, at the moment and in the near future, the
answer to these questions is unlikely to be affirmative, given that most people are not fond of
the AI field to the point of conceding it free will and rights, because AI today is still quite
inflexible and not general. Furthermore, AI does not possess the characteristics of a living
being, so, considering that many humans do not even concede rights to other living beings or
even humans, it is really unlikely that they will concede them to inanimate entities (like an AI).
The specific answer to all these questions depends on the actual legislation, which hu-
mans must establish (in a process that possibly involves an AI agent). Given the mentioned
weaknesses of ANNs and the possible undesirable consequences of the outcomes of their use, or-
ganizations, like the European Union, start to be concerned with these issues. More specifically,
the European Union’s recent General Data Protection Regulation [28] introduces new laws that
attempt to protect European citizens against the possible incompetence of AI or ML models. In
particular, the “right to explanation” of algorithmic decisions attempts to protect the European
citizens against these issues that can arise from the use of unexplainable AI models [29] (and
other related issues). Nonetheless, legal scholars have already criticised this right and stated
that it is unclear and unlikely to present a complete remedy to algorithmic harms [30]. More
specifically, an appropriate explanation depends on the context or situation and can be subjec-
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tive, so the promulgation of such related laws is not an easy task, considering that the AI field is
still evolving and its consequences, dangers or threats are not well understood yet. Regardless
of the defects of this and other laws, the main point is that certain important organisations
start to care more about the rights of humans with respect to the invasion of technology and,
in particular, AI, and the possible undesirable consequences of its adoption.
To conclude, the concept of explainable AI becomes always more relevant due to the re-
cent successes of AI and, more specifically, deep learning techniques, which arouses interest
in adopting these techniques to automate certain tasks (that involve ethics and lives), which
are currently mainly performed by humans. For this reason and other reasons, several impor-
tant organisations, like the European Union, have started to promulgate laws that attempt to
protect citizens against the invasion of technology and the related incompetence of humans.
Finally, the creation of a satisfactory XAI might be an AI-complete problem (that is, a true
XAI might be equivalent to an artificial general or human-level intelligence [31]), so, in other
words, this is a hard problem.
References
[1] L. H. Gilpin, D. Bau, B. Z. Yuan, A. Bajwa, M. Specter, and L. Kagal, “Explaining
Explanations: An Overview of Interpretability of Machine Learning,” arXiv e-prints,
p. arXiv:1806.00069, May 2018.
[2] S. Bach, A. Binder, G. Montavon, F. Klauschen, K.-R. Mu¨ller, and W. Samek, “On pixel-
wise explanations for non-linear classifier decisions by layer-wise relevance propagation,”
PLOS ONE, vol. 10, pp. 1–46, 07 2015.
[3] A. Binder, G. Montavon, S. Bach, K.-R. Mu¨ller, and W. Samek, “Layer-wise Relevance
Propagation for Neural Networks with Local Renormalization Layers,” arXiv e-prints,
p. arXiv:1604.00825, Apr 2016.
[4] M. Tulio Ribeiro, S. Singh, and C. Guestrin, ““Why Should I Trust You?”: Explaining
the Predictions of Any Classifier,” arXiv e-prints, p. arXiv:1602.04938, Feb 2016.
[5] C. Molnar, Interpretable Machine Learning. 2019. https://christophm.github.io/
interpretable-ml-book/.
[6] A. Vaswani, N. Shazeer, N. Parmar, J. Uszkoreit, L. Jones, A. N. Gomez, L. Kaiser, and
I. Polosukhin, “Attention Is All You Need,” arXiv e-prints, p. arXiv:1706.03762, Jun 2017.
[7] S. M. Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson and L. Kirchner, “Machine bias: There’s software used
across the country to predict future criminals. and it’s biased against blacks.,” ProPub-
4
lica, 2016. https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-
sentencing.
[8] A. Caliskan, J. J. Bryson, and A. Narayanan, “Semantics derived automatically from
language corpora contain human-like biases,” Science, vol. 356, pp. 183–186, Apr 2017.
[9] A. Nguyen, J. Yosinski, and J. Clune, “Deep Neural Networks are Easily Fooled: High
Confidence Predictions for Unrecognizable Images,” arXiv e-prints, p. arXiv:1412.1897,
Dec 2014.
[10] C. Szegedy, W. Zaremba, I. Sutskever, J. Bruna, D. Erhan, I. Goodfellow, and R. Fergus,
“Intriguing properties of neural networks,” arXiv e-prints, p. arXiv:1312.6199, Dec 2013.
[11] S.-M. Moosavi-Dezfooli, A. Fawzi, O. Fawzi, and P. Frossard, “Universal adversarial per-
turbations,” arXiv e-prints, p. arXiv:1610.08401, Oct 2016.
[12] N. Papernot, P. McDaniel, S. Jha, M. Fredrikson, Z. Berkay Celik, and A. Swami, “The
Limitations of Deep Learning in Adversarial Settings,” arXiv e-prints, p. arXiv:1511.07528,
Nov 2015.
[13] R. Jia and P. Liang, “Adversarial Examples for Evaluating Reading Comprehension Sys-
tems,” arXiv e-prints, p. arXiv:1707.07328, Jul 2017.
[14] I. J. Goodfellow, J. Shlens, and C. Szegedy, “Explaining and Harnessing Adversarial Ex-
amples,” arXiv e-prints, p. arXiv:1412.6572, Dec 2014.
[15] A. Madry, A. Makelov, L. Schmidt, D. Tsipras, and A. Vladu, “Towards Deep Learning
Models Resistant to Adversarial Attacks,” arXiv e-prints, p. arXiv:1706.06083, Jun 2017.
[16] Y. Liu, S. Ma, Y. Aafer, W.-C. Lee, J. Zhai, W. Wang, and X. Zhang, “Trojaning attack on
neural networks,” in 25nd Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium,
NDSS 2018, San Diego, California, USA, February 18-221, 2018, The Internet Society,
2018.
[17] J. Clements and Y. Lao, “Hardware Trojan Attacks on Neural Networks,” arXiv e-prints,
p. arXiv:1806.05768, Jun 2018.
[18] J. Baxter, “A Model of Inductive Bias Learning,” arXiv e-prints, p. arXiv:1106.0245, Jun
2011.
[19] Wikipedia contributors, “Universal approximation theorem — Wikipedia, the free ency-
clopedia,” 2019. [Online; accessed 16-June-2019].
5
[20] G. Cybenko, “Approximation by superpositions of a sigmoidal function,” Mathematics of
Control, Signals and Systems, vol. 2, pp. 303–314, Dec 1989.
[21] K. Hornik, “Approximation capabilities of multilayer feedforward networks,” Neural Net-
works, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 251 – 257, 1991.
[22] Z. Lu, H. Pu, F. Wang, Z. Hu, and L. Wang, “The expressive power of neural networks: A
view from the width,” in Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 30 (I. Guyon,
U. V. Luxburg, S. Bengio, H. Wallach, R. Fergus, S. Vishwanathan, and R. Garnett, eds.),
pp. 6231–6239, Curran Associates, Inc., 2017.
[23] B. Hanin, “Universal Function Approximation by Deep Neural Nets with Bounded Width
and ReLU Activations,” arXiv e-prints, p. arXiv:1708.02691, Aug 2017.
[24] B. C. Csa´ji, “Approximation with artificial neural networks,” Faculty of Sciences, Etvs
Lornd University, Hungary, vol. 24, p. 48, 2001.
[25] B. Hammer and K. Gersmann, “A note on the universal approximation capability of sup-
port vector machines,” Neural Processing Letters, vol. 17, 10 2002.
[26] United Nations, “Universal declaration of human rights.” https://www.un.org/en/
universal-declaration-human-rights/index.html, Dec. 1948. Accessed 17 June 2019.
[27] N. Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies. New York, NY, USA: Oxford
University Press, Inc., 1st ed., 2014.
[28] E. Commission, “2018 reform of eu data protection rules.” https://ec.europa.
eu/commission/priorities/justice-and-fundamental-rights/data-protection/
2018-reform-eu-data-protection-rules_en, 2018. [Online; accessed 17-June-2019].
[29] B. Goodman and S. Flaxman, “European Union regulations on algorithmic decision-
making and a “right to explanation”,” arXiv e-prints, p. arXiv:1606.08813, Jun 2016.
[30] L. Edwards and M. Veale, “Slave to the algorithm? why a ’right to an explanation’ is
probably not the remedy you are looking for.”
[31] D. Shahaf and E. Amir, “Towards a theory of ai completeness,” in AAAI Spring Sympo-
sium: Logical Formalizations of Commonsense Reasoning, 2007.
6
